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1. Introductory Remarks
The right to a fair trial is enshrined in Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and it represents one of the most 
fundamental guarantees for the respect of democracy and the rule 
of law on the European continent. Indeed, the concept of fair trial is 
a basic component of the wider notion of the separation of powers: 
it attributes to the judiciary - one of the three powers of the State -
its distinct character· from the other two, by determining which 
qualities - independence and impartiality - and which procedures 
make it an element of protection and security for those who are 
under the omnipotent jurisdiction of the State. The obligations, 
therefore, for the State under this Article go far beyond the 
protection afforded by some other articles of the Convention, as 
they are positive obligations by their nature, and hence require 
from the State and its authorities not only a mere abstention from 
acts which may be detrimental to an individual, but also, and above 
all, the taking of initiatives to ensure good administration of justice 
within the State. In sum, Article 6, while it encompasses the 
protection of individuals before the courts, at the same time 
identifies the basic features of the judiciary which distinguish it 
from the other two State powers. 
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The right to a fair trial refers both to criminal and civil cases and 
the corresponding proceedings. The first paragraph of Article 6 
applies equally to the two categories of cases, while the two 
remaining paragraphs 2 and 3 are designed to apply, by and large, 
to criminal proceedings. We say "by and large" because, although 
the intention of the legislator was to limit the applicability of these 
two paragraphs to penal cases, the Strasbourg organs have widely 
construed the obligations appearing on paragraphs 2 and 3, which 
has led to their application by analogy in civil cases, whenever 
feasible.1
It should also be pointed out, from the outset, that the Strasbourg 
case-law has led to the creation of new guarantees which are not 
specifically mentioned in the letter of the article as such, but which 
have emerged as a consequence of the development of this case­
law. These judge-made guarantees have been considered as natural 
corollaries of the written guarantees of Article 6 or, better, as 
guarantees which emanate from its very spirit of protection: the 
right of access to a court, the right to legal aid, or the equality of 
arms are three guarantees, now well-embedded in the judicial 
conscience, that all come from an extensive interpretation of 
Article 6. At the same time, and as a result of this extensive 
interpretation of Article 6, notions which were designed, by the 
European legislator, to have a more limited purview, have grown, 
through the case-law, to dimensions expanding the limits of 
protection of Article 6 in areas far wider than anticipated by its 
founding fathers. A classic example of this expansionist trend of 
the case-law is the creation of the autonomous notion of "civil 
rights and obligations" and of "criminal charge", which now covers 
categories of cases and proceedings which cannot be considered 
necessarily to have been anticipated by the drafters of the 
Convention. 
The task of this brief article is not, of course, to carry out a 
comprehensive analysis covering all the possible aspects of the first 
paragraph of Article 6, when it applies to civil cases. As we have 
already said, Article 6, in its first paragraph, does not make any 
distinction, as far as the guarantees contained therein are 
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concerned, between the civil or the criminal nature of judicial 
proceedings. And the case-law of Strasbourg has never isolated 
any of the guarantees as exclusively belonging to civil or criminal 
procedures. In these circumstances, we shall attempt to draw a 
distinction, somewhat artificially, by dealing in this introduction 
with guarantees that are not necessarily destined for civil cases, but 
which have been implemented by the Court, so far, mainly in civil 
proceedings, or have been implemented in a manner which treats in 
a different way civil and criminal proceedings. Our proposal is, 
therefore, to deal in this introduction with two aspects of paragraph 
1, the question of the access to court, which has mainly matured as 
a legal concept in civil cases, and the question of the fairness of the 
proceedings, seen from the angle of civil proceedings. 
2. Access to a Court
We start with the notion of access to a court. If we make the 
distinction between the institutional aspects of Article 6 and the 
procedural ones, institutional being e.g. the independence and 
impartiality of a tribunal, procedural being the fairness of a 
hearing, then the access question is, of course, one fundamental 
institutional aspect. As we have already mentioned, it is a judge­
made concept apyearing for the first time in the judgment of
Golder v. U.K.. In that 1975 case a prisoner was refused 
permission by the Home Secretary to write to a solicitor asking him 
to institute civil proceedings against a prison officer for libel. The 
Court held that Article 6 had been violated in the circumstances 
because its paragraph 1 concerned not only the conduct of the 
proceedings once they have been instituted, but also the right to 
institute them in the first place. Any other interpretation of Article 
6, according to the Court, would contradict a universally 
recognised principle of law and would allow a State to close its 
courts without infringing the Convention. With the lapse of time, 
the notion of a right of access to a court, or the equivalent wider 
notion of a right to a tribunal, has developed into one of the 
fundamental guarantees of Article 6, both in civil - par excellence -
and, sometimes, in criminal cases. The constitutive elements of this 
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novel concept, namely its specific components which have been set 
out in the case-law are the following: 
First, the right of access concerns both the factual circumstances of 
a case and its legal substratum. In other words, a person within the 
jurisdiction of a State-party to the Convention must have effective 
access to a court to settle his grievances on arguable civil claims. 
The Court does not make a distinction between impediments to this 
right deriving from factual difficulties and those stemming from 
legal regulations. Furthermore, as far as effectiveness is concerned, 
a person must have the facilities to vindicate his right before the 
courts and be able to enforce a decision determining that right. The 
case of Airey v. Ireland where an indigent woman was refused 
legal aid in very complex proceedings, where there was a need to 
examine expert witnesses, and where the Court found that refusal 
of legal aid equated to refusal of access, is a good example of this 
second requirement.3 The Court, however, made a distinction in 
that case between criminal and civil proceedings by stating that 
legal aid is required in civil cases, under the notion of access, only 
in situations where a person cannot plead his case effectively. 
Second, the right of access concerns also the right to a proper 
preparation of a civil case in that the authorities must keep people 
duly informed of measures taken concerning their civil rights, 
allowing them time to institute civil proceedings against these 
measures if they interfere with their rights. The locus classicus in 
this respect was the De Ia Pradelle v. France1 case where the 
administration had not properly informed interested persons, 
affected by the repercussions that a law decree had upon their real 
property. 
Third, the right of access is not an absolute right. The Court accepts 
that limitations may apply, as this right "by its very nature calls for 
regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and 
place according to the needs and resources of the community and 
of individuals" (Golder). However, although a State-party enjoys a 
certain "margin of appreciation", a limitation must not be such that 
"the very essence of the right is impaired" (Ashingdane v. the 
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U.K.).5 As with most of the limitations which are permissible under
the Convention, a restriction to the right of access must, in
addition, have a legitimate aim, and comply with the
proportionality test, in that there must exist "a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
the aim sought to be achieved" (Ashingdane).
The case-law of the Strasbourg organs has given an answer as to 
what can be considered acceptable limitations of a right to access. 
Specific categories of litigants may legitimately be prevented from 
instituting proceedings or participating in them: minors, prisoners, 
vexatious litigants. Equally, reasonable time-limits for instituting 
proceedings may be imposed; formal requirements must be 
respected, and reasonable fees to be paid by litigants may also be 
acceptable. 6 An interesting aspect of these restrictions is to be 
found in a series of cases whose State of origin is the United 
Kingdom and concerning jurisdictional bar on access based on an 
immunity or defence that may be invoked by a defendant in order 
to avoid adjudication of a case against him. The case of Fayed v. 
the U.K.
7 
is the first important case in this family, where the Court 
held that a defence of privilege available in an action for 
defamation brought by the owners of a company concerning 
allegations of fraud in a government inspector's report on the 
company was a permissible restriction on access. Its legitimate aim 
was to facilitate the investigation of public companies in the public 
interest and there was proportionality in the light of the State's 
margin of appreciation. That case was followed by Osman v. the 
U.K. 8 where the Court found that there was violation of the right of 
access because the applicants were prevented from suing the police 
on the basis of an absolute, blanket immunity protecting policemen 
from being sued in civil proceedings for negligence in the course of 
their duties. The blanket immunity was considered by the Court to 
be an unacceptable restriction because of its absolute and 
unqualified character, going beyond the permissible limits afforded 
to a State by its margin of appreciation. Strangely enough, the 
Court has recently overturned the Osman case-law, in a very 
similar case, concerning blanket immunity of local authorities in 
children's care matters, on the basis of reasoning which 
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unjustifiably, to my mind, attempts to distinguish that case from 
Osman.
9 
Finally, it should be underlined that a right of access may be 
subject to a legitimate waiver, provided that the waiver may be 
established on the basis of unequivocal conduct on the part of the 
person concerned. 10 
3. The Right to a Fair Hearing
The right to a "fair hearing" is the other generic notion which 
applies to civil cases in a way which marginally differs from its 
application to criminal cases. As the Court has said "the 
contracting States have a greater latitude when dealing with civil 
cases concerning civil rights and obligations than they have when 
dealing with criminal cases" (Dombo Beheer Bovo v. the 
Netherlands).
11 As it has been pertinently stated by the doctrine: 
" ... although certain of the guarantees listed in Article 6 (3) (e.g. 
the right to legal assistance or to examine or cross examine 
witnesses) may in principle be inherent in a ''fair hearing" in civil 
as well as in criminal cases, they may not apply with quite the same 
rigour or in precisely the same way in civil proceedings as they do 
in criminal ones. The same is true of such rights as the right to be 
present at the trial and to 'equality of arms' that flow exclusively 
from Article 6 (1) in both criminal and civil cases" . 12 
We therefore propose to have a close look at certain instances of 
the Strasbourg case-law in order to delineate the limits of 
protection afforded by the organ( s) of the Convention in civil cases 
on the issue of "fair hearing". 
a. With regard to the presence of a party to a hearing, the case­
law demonstrates that, unlike in criminal cases, in civil cases, the
presence of a party is not absolutely necessary, and that it may be
limited to specific circumstances, for instance in cases where
assessment of the party's personality is required. In most cases the
presence of a lawyer suffices to satisfy the requirement of fairness.
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It goes without saying that an unequivocal waiver of the right to be 
present is also accepted by the case-law. 
b. With regard to the notion of "equality of arms", i.e. the premise
that "everyone who is a party to . . . proceedings shall have a
reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the Court under
conditions which do not place him at substantial disadvantage vis­
a-vis his opponent" (Kaufman v. Belgium), 13 the Court has
developed a rich case-law in civil matters. In the Ruiz Mateos v.
Spain
14 
case, the Court found a violation of the principle because
the applicants were not allowed to reply to written submissions
made by the Counsel for the State before the domestic appeal court.
In the Stran-Andreadis v. Greece case, the Court stated that the
"principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial enshrined
in Article 6 preclude any interference by the legislature with the
administration of justice designed to influence the judicial
determination of the dispute" .
15 The legislative interference may be
seen, of course, as an issue of equality of arms, but also as a
problem of infringement of a right to a tribunal, even as a problem
of independence of the courts (see also recent case-law on the
participation of the Commissaire du Gouvernement m
administrative proceedings, in Kress v. France). 16 
c. With regard to the evidence in civil cases, the constant position
of the Court is that domestic courts are not required to follow
particular rules on evidence. It is within the margin of appreciation
of the States-parties to the Convention and their courts to determine
such rules provided, of course, that they do not infringe the
fundamental procedural guarantees provided for by Article 6.
A similar problem to that of evidence, is the invocation by 
applicants of errors on the facts or the law allegedly committed by 
national courts in their assessment of the facts and in their 
interpretation of the law. The traditional approach of the European 
Court on this matter is that Article 6, incorporating procedural 
guarantees, is not designed to be the legal basis for a review of the 
facts and of the substantive law upon which the national judge 
decided the case. The European Court is not a "fourth instance" 
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court, called upon to re-examine, under Article 6, the merits of a 
case or the interpretation of the applicable domestic law. The Court 
only reviews errors which are relevant to the procedure followed, 
errors in procedendo, not errors injudicando. 
In the recent case-law of the Court this principle has been 
reinstated. Yet, in some instances the Court has reached a threshold 
of the "fourth instance". This happened for instance in the case of 
Dulaurans v. France.
17 
In this case, the applicant complained that 
the Court of Cassation declared inadmissible the only complaint 
she made before it because it considered that that complaint had 
been raised for the first time at the stage of cassation; while, in 
reality, the complaint had already been raised in the submissions at 
the appeal stage. The European Court remarked that the right to a 
fair hearing required that the observations of the parties must really 
be heard and duly examined by the domestic tribunals. According 
to that principle, a court has the obligation to proceed to an 
effective examination of the complaints, argument and evidence 
offered by the parties in order to assess their pertinence. In 
examining the judgment of the Appeal Court, in the circumstances 
of the case, the European Court reached the conclusion that the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal in its operative part was an 
answer to an allegation of the applicant raised at the appeal stage 
and, hence, the Court of Cassation was not right to say that this 
complaint was a new one raised at the cassation stage. Here we are 
confronted with a situation where the European Court enters into 
the merits of a case and scrutinises a judicial decision to find 
whether a procedural error was committed by a court. 
An interesting aspect of errors committed by national courts 
concerns the non-respect of formalities provided for by national 
legislation. In the case of Leoni v. Italy18, the applicant's appeal to 
the Court of Cassation was rejected by that court because the 
appeal deposited at the Registry of the Appeal Court was not 
transferred to the Registry of the Court of Cassation in time. The 
European Court found that that error was an error of the authorities 
and that an applicant cannot be penalised for the non-respect of 
formalities by the Appeal Court. In the same vein, in a Greek case, 
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Platakou, 19 the European Court found a violation by the Greek
State because of a delay in transmitting an appeal to a court, which 
was attributable to the "huissier de justice", and which led to a loss 
of opportunity for the applicant to lodge her appeal. As in the 
previous case, the European Court attributed responsibility to the 
State whose organ was responsible for the delay. 
4. Some Concluding Remarks
As we have already said, it is impossible in the limited space of this 
article to deal exhaustively with all the issues which have been 
raised by the case-law of the Court and concern civil proceedings. 
Let us then stop here, and allow ourselves some lines to deal 
succinctly with the core problem of this discussion which we have 
left till last, although in reality it is the first consideration, namely 
what is considered by the Court to be a "civil case" worthy of 
protection by Article 6. 
It is well-known, of course, that neither the Convention when 
referring in Article 6 to "civil rights and obligations" nor the 
Court's case-law have provided a general definition of the term. 
Although it seems that the drafters, when preparing the 
Convention, were in favour of a rather restrictive approach to the 
notion, the Strasbourg organs have expanded the purview of the 
term - as they have done with regard to the term "criminal charge" 
to cover proceedings which do not necessarily belong to the purely 
civil sphere. The Court has held on several occasions that Article 6 
applies to proceedings whose outcome has a direct bearing on the 
determination and/or substantive content of a private right or 
obligation. Applying the criterion "decisive for private rights or 
obligations", referring to the applicability of Article 6, "the 
Strasbourg organs declared that the Article applies to several 
categories of what would often be considered as public law 
disputes ... " .20 Many of the cases concern administrative 
proceedings affecting contracts for the sale or expropriation of 
land, nationalisation of property, environmental protection, practice 
of professions, regulation of licence to conduct certain economic 
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activities. There have also been cases concerning social benefits, 
including sometimes cases of unjust dismissal. 
In all these categories of cases, the prevailing element which has 
led the Court to identify them as civil cases, was an element of an 
economic interest for an individual, or a private interest at stake 
(such as reputation, well-being, quality of life), considered to be of 
such importance as to override the public-law character of a case. 
In any event the Court seems to have adopted in these instances an 
approach which implicitly accepts that a public law character of a 
case is not necessarily affected, in regard to the core issue of the 
discretion of a State, by the mere fact that, if proceedings exist to 
control it, these proceedings must comply with the procedural 
guarantees offered by Article 6. 
In these circumstances, the only categories of cases, bearing a 
public-law element, which resist the control of the Court - because 
the Court so decides - are mainly immigration and asylum 
proceedings as well as tax proceedings. The exclusion of the latter 
was challenged in a recent case, the case of Ferrazzini v. Italy.21 
The majority (rather numerically reduced if compared to previous 
cases on the same issue) of the Court decided to uphold its constant 
case-law on the basis of the argument that taxation still belongs to 
the "hard core of public authority prerogatives, with the public 
nature of the relationship between the tax-payers and the tax 
authority remaining predominant". The position of the dissenters is 
expressed in an opinion written by Judge Lorenzen: 
"the finding that Article 6 § 1 ... is applicable to tax cases does not 
in any way restrict the States' power to place whatever fiscal 
obligations on the individuals and companies they may wish. Nor 
does such a finding restrict the States' freedom to enforce such 
laws as they deem necessary in order to secure the payment of 
taxes... Article 6 ... is a procedural guarantee that grants primarily 
the right of access to a court and the right to have court 
proceedings determined fairly within a reasonable time". This 
dictum may, of course, equally apply to all other categories of cases 
which still remain outside the purview of Article's 6 control. 
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The last words of the quotation from the dissenting opinion brings 
us to the issue of the length of proceedings as a ground for 
violation of Article 6. Length of proceedings in civil cases 
represents today, statistically, the most frequently invoked violation 
of Article 6. For many European States it is the most typical 
violation stemming from their domestic proceedings. This is 
extremely serious, on the one hand, because length of proceedings 
may have adverse consequences for the good administration of 
justice. But it may also be seen, on the other hand, as a positive 
element in the long adventure towards compliance of European 
States with the guarantees of the Convention: if in today's Europe 
the great bulk of cases are length of proceedings cases, this 
phenomenon demonstrates a tendency of compliance of States with 
the Convention's precepts on other, more hard core guarantees. Let 
this optimistic statement be the last words of this small 
contribution. 
Christos Rozakis 
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